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NOTE
A “20/20” Vision: Supreme Court of
Missouri Revisits Admissibility of
Eyewitness Expert Testimony After More
Than 30 Years
State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355 (Mo. 2020)
Emily Miller*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1989 the admissibility of expert testimony regarding
eyewitness identifications has been unaddressed in Missouri’s courts.1
During this time, over 2,000 scientific studies have illustrated the
fallibility of eyewitness testimony.2 The United States Supreme Court has
long recognized the “vagaries” of eyewitness identification and the real
potential for erroneous identifications leading to wrongful convictions.3
Most recently, advanced capabilities with DNA evidence have highlighted
the tragic consequences of erroneous eyewitness identification.4 Indeed,
*

B.S. Economics, Emporia State University, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of
Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review,
2021–2022. I would like to thank Professor Rodney Uphoff for his expertise and
guidance during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its
help in the editing process.
1. State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355 (Mo. 2020) (en banc); State v. Whitmill,
80 S.W.2d 45 (Mo. 1989) (en banc); State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1988)
(en banc).
2. “The volume of that research has been remarkable: over two thousand studies
on eyewitness memory have been published in a variety of professional journals over
the past 30 years.” Report of the Special Master at 9, State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872
(2011)
(No.
62,218)
(available
at
https://www.physics.smu.edu/pseudo/Eyewitness/NJreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YDL6-C7Z7]).
3. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“The vagaries of
eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with
instances of mistaken identification.”).
4. Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7
PSYCH.
SCI.
IN
THE
PUB.
INT.
45,
48
(2006),
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a now often-cited fact: Of the 375 exonerations since 1989, nearly seventy
percent involved wrongful convictions founded at least in part on
eyewitness identification.5
One method used to combat erroneous eyewitness identification is
expert testimony.6 Two Supreme Court of Missouri decisions from the
late 80s, however, State v. Lawhorn and State v. Whitmill, regularly
allowed Missouri’s appellate courts to affirm trial court decisions
excluding expert testimony related to eyewitness identification.7 In State
v. Carpenter, the Supreme Court of Missouri revisited the standard of
admissibility for expert testimony on eyewitness identification, holding
that its earlier decisions no longer controlled.8 The decision in State v.
Carpenter is significant, as it changes a long-standing precedent and aligns
Missouri’s approach to eyewitness expert testimony with the majority of
the country.9
The Court’s holding in Carpenter is a much-needed improvement for
defendants seeking to admit eyewitness expert testimony. This Note
argues, however, that in the larger scheme of combatting erroneous
eyewitness identification and subsequent wrongful convictions, Carpenter
is only one step. Part II of this Note provides Carpenter’s procedural
background and the Supreme Court of Missouri’s holding. Then, Part III
explains the fallibility of eyewitness identifications and outlines the legal
framework of various safeguards that are designed to combat such
fallibility. Part IV details the Carpenter majority’s departure from
Missouri’s long-standing precedent and ultimate conclusion that the trial
court erred when it excluded eyewitness expert testimony. Finally, Part V
posits additional measures that Missouri should take, including providing
more informative jury instructions and implementing identification
procedure reform.

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1529-1006.2006.00027.x
[https://perma.cc/NYC8-N32Z] (“Rather, the advent of forensic DNA testing has
changed the way the legal system views eyewitness evidence.”).
5. Eyewitness
Identification
Reform,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/eyewitness-identification-reform/
[https://perma.cc/43JL-E7PZ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2021).
6. State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 696 (Or. 2012) (“[E]xpert testimony is one
method by which the parties can educate the trier of fact concerning variables that can
affect the reliability of eyewitness identification.”).
7. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); State v. Whitmill,
780 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
8. State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
9. Id.; Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 782 (Pa. 2014) (noting that
forty-four states permit expert testimony on eyewitness identifications “for the
purpose of aiding the trier of fact in understanding the characteristics of eyewitness
identification”).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On the evening of October 23, 2016, Jacob Williams, a young white
man, walked down Capitol Avenue in Jefferson City, Missouri listening
to music on his headphones.10 In the darkness, dimly lit by a streetlight
some distance away, Williams noticed two black men approaching.11 The
men wore hoodies pulled low over their faces and quickly overtook
Williams.12 Williams tried to cross the street to avoid the men, but they
blocked his path, one standing in front of Williams and the other behind.13
The assailant in front of Williams demanded to use Williams’s phone,
but Williams said he did not have one and explained that his music was
playing on an iPod. 14 The assailant lifted his shirt, revealing what
Williams believed was a pistol tucked into the man’s waistband, and
ordered Williams to “[g]ive me what you have, or I’ll shoot you.”15 He
took Williams’s iPhone and headphones while the other assailant grabbed
Williams’s e-cigarette and nicotine cartridge.16 The two men fled. The
encounter lasted less than one minute.17
Williams tried to follow the men, but lost sight of them as they ran
toward an alley.18 Williams asked a nearby couple to use their phone to
report the robbery. While on the phone, Williams reported to the 911
operator that two young black men, one in a red hoodie and one in a black
hoodie, had accosted him in the street.19 Five minutes elapsed between
Williams first noticing his assailants and officers arriving on scene.20
Moments later, a sergeant drove by the alley where Williams had last seen
his attackers.21 The sergeant stopped his car when he saw Carpenter and
another young black man and asked to speak with them.22 Carpenter
stopped immediately, while the other young man took a few steps as if he
might run, before stopping as well.23 The sergeant found an iPhone, with
headphones still attached, near to the place Carpenter was standing.24 The
sergeant asked other responding officers to bring Williams to where he
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d at 357.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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had found Carpenter and the other young man to see if Williams could
identify them as the robbers.25 The officers drove Williams to the
sergeant’s location and informed him that he would see the potential
robbers and be asked if he recognized them.26 When Williams arrived, an
officer shone a spotlight on the two young men who were now handcuffed
and seated on the curb.27 From the car, and less than ten minutes after the
crime was committed, Williams confirmed that the two men were the
robbers.28 Williams specifically identified Carpenter as the man who
threatened him with a pistol but noted Carpenter was not wearing the red
hoodie he wore during the robbery.29 Carpenter and his companion were
placed under arrest.30
Carpenter was charged with one count of first-degree robbery.31 The
prosecution’s case against him was predominately, but not completely,
built on Williams’s “show up” identification.32 Before trial, Carpenter’s
counsel gave notice that he would call an expert witness, Dr. James
Lampinen, to testify about the factors that can impact eyewitness
reliability.33 The state successfully moved to exclude the expert, arguing
such testimony should be inadmissible under State v. Lawhorn and its
progeny.34
At trial, Williams testified that he was “one hundred percent certain”
Carpenter was the man who had threatened and robbed him.35 Carpenter’s
counsel again sought to admit Dr. Lampinen’s testimony, but the circuit
court sustained the State’s objection.36 After the close of all evidence, the
judge instructed the jury using Missouri Approved Instruction–Criminal
(“MAI-CR”) 310.02, which lists seventeen factors juries should consider
when evaluating an eyewitness identification.37 The jury found Carpenter
guilty of first-degree robbery.38 Carpenter appealed, claiming the circuit
25. Id. at 357–58.
26. Id. at 358.
27. Id. at 358.
28. Id. at 358.
29. Id. at 358.
30. Id. at 358.
31. Id. at 356. Victim confirmed the iPhone was his as he was able to unlock it
with his fingerprint. Id. at 358. Additionally, Victim’s e-cigarette and nicotine
cartridge were found in the alley where Victim had seen the two men running, along
with the driver’s license of the young man that was with Defendant. Id. Right off the
alley, one black hoodie and one red hoodie were found. No pistol was ever found. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 358.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 358 n.1.
38. Id. at 358.
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court erred in excluding Dr. Lampinen’s expert testimony.39 The Supreme
Court of Missouri granted transfer, holding that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding Dr. Lampinen’s testimony and, moreover, that
Lawhorn and its progeny were no longer controlling precedent. It held
instead that RSMo § 490.065.2, enacted in 2017, governed the issue.40

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Erroneous eyewitness identification has become ubiquitously known
as the leading cause of wrongful convictions.41 As a result, over time, the
criminal justice system has implemented safeguards designed to mitigate
inaccurate identifications and prevent wrongful convictions when
misidentifications do occur.42 This Part briefly addresses the fallibility of
eyewitness identification and discusses two safeguards – jury instructions
and eyewitness expert testimony – focusing on the development of
Missouri law regarding each.

A. Memory: Malleable and Fallible
An understanding of memory – the way in which the mind stores and
recalls information – is essential to the study of eyewitness identification.43
Elizabeth Loftus, a leading expert on false memories and eyewitness
misidentification, describes memory like a “Wikipedia page,” that is,
“[Y]ou can go in there and change it, but so can other people.”44 This
notion, however, is counterintuitive; people believe memory functions like

39. Id.
40. Id. at 356–57, 359.
41. State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 729–30 (Conn. 2012); State v. Henderson, 27
A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011) (“Indeed, it is now widely known
that eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions across
the country.”).
42. Henderson, 27 A.3d. at 912 (“Beyond the scientific community, law
enforcement and reform agencies across the nation have taken note of the scientific
findings. In turn, they have formed task forces and recommended or implemented new
procedures to improve the reliability of eyewitness identifications.”).
43. See Cara Laney & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony and Memory
Biases,
NOBA,
https://nobaproject.com/modules/eyewitness-testimony-andmemory-biases [https://perma.cc/EL83-5QSJ] (last visited Apr. 18, 2021) (“In
addition to correctly remembering many details of the crimes they witness,
eyewitnesses often need to remember the faces and other identifying features of the
perpetrators of those crimes. Eyewitnesses are often asked to describe that perpetrator
to law enforcement and later to make identifications from books of mug shots or
lineups.”).
44. TED, How reliable is your memory? Elizabeth Loftus, YOUTUBE (Sep. 23,
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PB2OegI6wvI [https://perma.cc/3C38UQAJ] (comment starts at 5:25).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [], Art. 11

982

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

a videotape, “accurately and thoroughly capturing and reproducing a
person, scene, or event.”45 Research, however, shows otherwise, that
memory is instead “a constructive, dynamic and selective process.”46
Specifically, the memory process is split into three stages: encoding,
storage, and retrieval.47 Encoding is the process by which an individual
takes in and learns of information.48 Next, storage describes the process
of retaining encoded information in an individual’s memory and the
amount retained.49
Lastly, retrieval involves accessing stored
information.50
In the context of eyewitness identification, various factors can impact
one or multiple stages of the memory process and affect the accuracy of
identification.51 These are categorized into “estimator” variables and
“system” variables.52 Estimator variables are those beyond the control of
law enforcement,53 for example, the cross-race effect: the race of the
victim compared to the race of the perpetrator; the weapon-effect: whether
the perpetrator used a weapon; and the confidence of the eyewitness in his
or her identification.54 In contrast, system variables are within the control
of law enforcement and involve the procedures for obtaining an
eyewitness identification.55 For example, whether police use a line-up or
show-up, line-up construction, blind administration, and pre-identification
instructions are all factors controlled by law-enforcement authorities that
may affect the accuracy of an eyewitnesses’ identification.56

45. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 9 (“The central precept is that
memory does not function like a videotape, accurately and thoroughly capturing and
reproducing a person, scene or event . . . Memory is, rather, a constructive, dynamic
and selective process.”).
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. How Memory Works, HARVARD UNIV., https://bokcenter.harvard.edu/howmemory-works [https://perma.cc/RNK5-H6LH] (last visited Apr. 23, 2021).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 10 (“At each of those stages,
the information ultimately offered as ‘memory’ can be distorted, contaminated and
even falsely imagined.”).
52. Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 277, 279 (2003). Professor Gary Wells first used these terms in the 1970s
when the breadth of research that exists today was just spring boarding. See Gary L.
Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator
Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546, 1548 (1978).
53. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 11–12.
54. Miko M. Wilford & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness System Variables, in REFORM
OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 23, 25 (B. L. Cutler ed., 2013).
55. Wells & Olson, supra note 52, at 279.
56. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss3/11
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Although the general fallibility of eyewitness testimony is commonly
known, studies continually show jurors do not understand why memory
can be unreliable.57 Without understanding the particular factors affecting
eyewitness identification accuracy, jurors do not know how to assess a
particular eyewitness’s testimony.58

1. Estimator Variables
Some estimator variables, such as the quality of lighting at the
witnessed event or the distance from which the victim viewed the
perpetrator, and their potential impact are more intuitive.59 Others are
more difficult to understand and explain.60
First, the cross-race effect – also known as “Other-Race Effect” or
“Own-Race Bias” – describes the phenomenon that individuals are better
at remembering the faces of individuals of the same race.61 Indeed, studies
consistently show eyewitnesses are more likely to falsely identify a
57. State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 723 (Conn. 2012) (“Although the[] findings
[regarding the variables] are widely accepted by scientists, they are largely unfamiliar
to the average person, and, in fact, many of the findings are counterintuitive.”); see
Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory is Still Not Common Sense:
Comparing Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115, 116 (2006); Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken?
Testing Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS
177, 193–198 (2006); Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL 1 (4th ed. 2007).
58. State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1108 (Utah 2009); State v. Lawson, 291
P.3d 673, 696 (Or. 2012) (“[M]any of the system and estimator variables that we
described earlier are either unknown to the average juror or contrary to common
assumptions[.]”).
59. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 910 (N. J. 2011) (“Some of the findings
[factors] described above are intuitive. Everyone knows, for instance, that bad lighting
conditions make it more difficult to perceive the details of a person’s face. Some
findings are less obvious.”).
60. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 48 (“Studies examining
whether and to what extent jurors (or potential jurors) know or correctly intuit the
findings reported in the eyewitness identification literature report that laypersons are
largely unfamiliar with those findings and often hold beliefs to the contrary.”) (“The
2006 study, comparing juror acceptance of the same research findings (24T 57-62),
found that jurors were substantially less receptive to such concepts as cross-race bias
(90% acceptance by experts, 47% by jurors), weapons focus (87% by experts, 39% by
jurors), weak correlation between confidence and accuracy (87% by experts, 38% by
jurors), and memory decay (83% by experts, 33% by jurors.”)); Guilbert, 49 A.3d at
723 (“Although the[] findings [regarding the variables] are widely accepted by
scientists, they are largely unfamiliar to the average person and, in fact, many of the
findings are counterintuitive.”).
61. John C. Brigham et al., The Influence of Race on Eyewitness Memory, in THE
HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY 257, 257–58 (David F. Ross et al. eds.,
2006).
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perpetrator of another race.62 Studies also show, however, that jurors do
not understand the cross-race effect. For example, in one study, fortyeight percent of potential jurors believed that cross-race and same-race
identifications were equally reliable, and eleven percent believed crossrace identifications could actually be more reliable.
Second, the presence of a weapon at the witnessed event negatively
impacts the accuracy of subsequent identifications.63 The literature terms
this the “weapon-focus effect.”64 Specifically, studies explain that the
“visible presence of a weapon diverts a witness’s attention away from the
face of the perpetrator and reduces the witness’s ability to encode, describe
and identify the face.”65 A third factor, related to the weapon-focus effect,
is the stress of an event. The highly stressful nature of victimization can
decrease the reliability of an eyewitnesses’ identification.66 While the
individual may not forget the event itself, highly stressful events can
interfere with the encoding process.67
Finally, one common misconception is that the level of confidence an
eyewitness expresses when testifying at trial is a reliable predictor of the
accuracy of the identification.68 This relationship, termed the confidenceaccuracy relationship, hypothesizes that as an individual’s confidence in
the identification increases, so does the likelihood of its accuracy.69 The
reality, however, is that confidence and accuracy are only weakly
correlated.70 This fallacy is particularly concerning, as research shows

62. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 48.
63. Id. at 44.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 43. The scientific literature reports that, while moderate levels of stress
improve cognitive processing and might improve accuracy, an eyewitness under high
stress is less likely to make a reliable identification of the perpetrator. Id.
67. Report of Special Master, supra note 2, at 43. Stress and fear ensure that the
witness will not forget the event, but they interfere with the ability to encode reliable
details. Id. “The effect of stress is illustrated in a 2004 field study involving 500
active-duty military personnel in a survival- school program, who were subjected to
12 hours of confinement followed by two 40-minute interrogations, one under high
stress with physical confrontation and the other under low stress, conducted by
different interrogators. When asked the following day to identify their interrogators,
the participants correctly identified the high- stress interrogator at only half the rate
they identified the low-stress interrogator; some, indeed, were even unable to identify
the high-stress interrogator’s gender.” Id.
68. Id. at 50 (“What jurors primarily rely on in assessing identification accuracy
is the confidence expressed by the witness in the identification, although, as previously
discussed, the literature demonstrates that the confidence/accuracy correlation is weak
at best and that confidence is highly malleable.”).
69. Id.
70. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss3/11
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jurors primarily rely on an eyewitness’s expressed confidence when
assessing that witness’s testimony.71

2. System Variables
System variables include all the ways that law enforcement retrieves
and records a witness’ memory.72 One system variable with significant
influence on the accuracy of identifications includes the type of
identification procedure used: show-up, line-up, or photo array.73
A show-up occurs when a police officer takes a witness to a location
to show the witness an apprehended suspect.74 Show-ups are different than
other identification procedures, such as line-ups or photo arrays, because
show-ups involve only one suspect.75 Frequently, the suspect is already
handcuffed or in the back of a police car when the witness arrives.76 As
the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized there is a “commonsense
notion that one-on-one show-ups are inherently suggestive . . . because the
victim can only choose from one person, and, generally, that person is in
police custody.”77

B. Safeguards
This Section will address the legal framework regarding safeguards
against misidentification and resulting wrongful convictions, including
jury instructions and eyewitness expert testimony generally and will also
describe Missouri law concerning each.

1. Jury Instructions
Jury instructions are one safeguard designed to protect against the
fallibility of eyewitness identification. The United States Supreme Court
71. Id.
72. The Science Behind Eyewitness Identification Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://innocenceproject.org/science-behind-eyewitness-identification-reform/
[https://perma.cc/AH5U-VPXZ] (last visited July 26, 2021).
73. Id.
74. Eyewitness
Identification,
CALIFORNIA
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
https://californiainnocenceproject.org/issues-we-face/eyewitness-identification/ (last
visited April 25, 2021).
75. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 29 (“A showup is an
identification procedure in which just a single suspect is presented to the witness.”).
76. Eyewitness Identification, supra note 74.
77. State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 183 (N.J. 2006); NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 31
(2014) (“The U.S. Supreme Court, in its 1977 ruling in Manson v. Brathwaite, set out
the modern test under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution that regulates
the fairness and the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence.”).
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has recognized the value of, but not mandated, the use of jury instructions
for this purpose.78 State courts vary as to whether a jury instruction should
be given and,79 when given, how comprehensive the instruction should
be.80 New Jersey – whose jury instruction Missouri later considered using
to model its own – believes that a comprehensive jury instruction, which
thoroughly explains factors affecting eyewitness reliability, should be
mandated in all cases involving eyewitness identification.81 Indeed, in
State v. Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court revised its legal
framework regarding eyewitness identification including adopting a
comprehensive cautionary jury instruction and mandating its use in all
cases with an eyewitness identification.82
In 2016, Missouri adopted Missouri Approved Instruction-Criminal
310.02, which apprises the jury of seventeen factors to consider when
evaluating eyewitness testimony.83
Initially, Missouri considered
patterning its instruction after that in State v. Henderson. Ultimately,
however, Missouri pared down the instruction to a version that provided
less explanation.84

2. Expert Testimony
Expert testimony is an additional method to inform jurors of
particular factors that contribute to the unreliability of eyewitness
identification.85 Before 1983, however, courts regularly excluded
eyewitness expert testimony.86 In fact, before 1983, every reported
78. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 233 (2012); see also U.S. v.
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (Dist. Ct. App. D.C. 1972).
79. See WILLIAM CARROLL & MICHAEL SENG, Jury Instructions, in Eyewitness
Testimony: Strategy and Tactics § 9:5 (2d ed. 2009) (comparing state court approaches
to the use of jury instructions for eyewitness testimony).
80. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 925–27 (N. J. 2011) (comprehensive jury
instructions); see also MASS. COURT SYS, MODEL EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
INSTRUCTION 9.160 1–11 (2015) (comprehensive jury instructions).
81. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 928.
82. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 34–35 (2014) (discussing jury instructions in
Henderson).
83. Mo. Jury Instr. Crim. MAI-CR 310.02 [2016 New] Eyewitness Identification
Testimony.
84. Tricia Bushnell & Amol Sinha, Show Me Real Eyewitness ID Reform, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (2016).
85. Com. v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 784 (Pa. 2014).
86. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (noting that
“[a]lmost uniformly, state and federal courts have upheld the trial court’s exercise of
discretion to exclude expert testimony on eyewitness identification…” and collecting
cases); see also Com. v. Francis, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Mass. 1983) (collecting
cases).
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appellate opinion to consider the admissibility of eyewitness expert
testimony upheld a trial court’s decision to exclude it.87 Some courts
prohibited eyewitness expert testimony altogether,88 while other courts left
trial judges with discretion on the issue. Even under the latter approach,
trial judges often excluded such testimony.89 Courts’ usual justifications
for excluding eyewitness expert testimony included that it invaded the
province of the jury, the testimony’s subject matter was within the
common knowledge of jurors, and/or cross-examination, as well as
opening and closing arguments, adequately protected the defendant.90
Today, however, the national trend shows states are more frequently
allowing experts to testify as to the unreliability of eyewitness
identification.91 Many state supreme courts have overturned years of case
law supporting an absolute prohibition of defendants’ attempts to admit
eyewitness expert testimony.92 Additionally, courts have repeatedly
invalidated the formerly proffered justifications for excluding eyewitness
expert testimony.
Despite this trend, for over thirty years, Missouri’s case law has
consistently excluded expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification. In State v. Lawhorn, the Supreme Court of Missouri
considered, as an issue of first impression, whether a trial court had abused
its discretion in excluding the defendant’s expert testimony on the
reliability of eyewitness identification.93
In Lawhorn, the defendant, on trial for first-degree burglary, sought
to introduce expert testimony to explain how the other-race effect, the
effects of the passage of time, stress at the time of the crime, and how the
human brain retrieves memories of facial recognition combine to diminish
a witness’s ability to make an accurate identification.94 The court
87. HON D. DUFF MCKEE, 35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1 (Originally published
in 1996); State v. Chapple, 660 P.3d 1208, 1224 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc) (first appellate
decision holding that the trial court’s exclusion of expert eyewitness testimony was
abuse of discretion).
88. See Walker, 92 A.3d at 775.
89. See Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 822–23.
90. Id. at 823 (“We believe, however, that such matters are within the general
realm of common experience of members of a jury and can be evaluated without an
expert’s assistance.”); State v. Kemp, 507 A.2d 1387, 1390 (Conn. 1986) (“The
weaknesses of identifications can be explored on cross-examination and during
counsel’s final arguments to the jury.”).
91. See, e.g., Com. v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 910 (Mass. 2015); State v. Guilbert,
49 A.3d 705, 730–31 (Conn. 2012); People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374, 375–76
(N.Y. Ct. App. 2007); U.S. v. Graves, 465 F. Supp. 2d 450, 460 (E.D. Pa. 2006); see
also Com. v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 782–83 (Pa. 2014) (collecting cases).
92. See Walker, 92 A.3d at 783–84 (2014) (collecting state supreme court
decisions abandoning the absolute exclusion of eyewitness expert testimony).
93. Lawhorn, 762 S.W2d at 822.
94. Id. at 822–23.
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articulated that eyewitness expert testimony is admissible if it is clear that
the subject of the testimony is one upon which the jurors, for want of
experience or knowledge, would otherwise be incapable of drawing a
proper conclusion from the facts in evidence.95 Otherwise, if expert
testimony will not assist the jury or if it unnecessarily diverts the jury’s
attention from relevant issues, it should be excluded.96 Additionally, the
court posited that “expert testimony is also inadmissible if it relates to the
credibility of witnesses, for this constitutes an invasion of the province of
the jury.”97
Applying this framework, the court concluded the subject of
Lawhorn’s expert’s testimony was “within the general realm of common
experience of members of a jury and can be evaluated without an expert’s
assistance.”98 The court also thought that cross-examination would
adequately expose any issues with the eyewitness’ identification and that
the issue could be reiterated in closing arguments.99 Thus, the Missouri
court ultimately held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the expert testimony.100
One year later, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed Lawhorn’s
holding in State v. Whitmill.101 In Whitmill, the court described Lawhorn
as holding that a trial court “may, in its discretion,” exclude expert
testimony regarding the credibility of eyewitness identifications.102
Despite the purported “wide discretion” given to a trial judge, Lawhorn
and Whitmill, when applied, created a near-per se ban on eyewitness expert
testimony.103
Most recently, in 2017, Missouri enacted Missouri Revised Statute
Section 490.065.2 as the new standard for the admissibility of expert
testimony in civil and criminal cases.104 In American jurisprudence, the
admissibility of expert testimony is predominately governed by either the

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 823.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. State v. Whitmill, 780 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
102. Id.
103. See State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Mo. 2020) (en banc)
(“After Lawhorn, such evidence has routinely–if not uniformly –been excluded.”).
104. Tim McCurdy, Missouri Adopts Daubert: Sea Change or Ripple on the
Pond?, MISSOURI BAR BLOG (April 25, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://burgerlaw.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/missouri-adopts-daubert.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V2MQ4JZH]. The new law signed by Gov. Greitens adopts verbatim the language of FRE
702. Id. The new language combined with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence dating
back to Daubert will raise the standard required for parties to introduce expert
testimony. Id.
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Frye or Daubert standard.105 Before 2017, in criminal cases, Missouri
courts applied Frye when determining the admissibility of expert
testimony.106 Section 490.065.2, however, was an exact codification of
the Daubert standard. 107 Despite this change, it was unclear whether
courts would begin to admit eyewitness expert testimony. After all,
Lawhorn already purported to leave the decision within the judge’s
discretion.108 Thus, while Section 490.065.2 would now apply to expert
testimony in criminal cases, this did not guarantee a change in outcome
for the admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony.109

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In State v. Carpenter, the majority quickly ushered Lawhorn v. State
and its progeny away, asserting they no longer controlled the admissibility
of eyewitness expert testimony because they were abrogated in 2017 by
Missouri’s enactment of Section 490.065.2.110 Judge Wilson, writing for
105. See generally MARGARET A. BERGER, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY 12 (2011). Under Frye, an expert opinion is admissible if the scientific
technique on which the opinion is based is “generally accepted” as reliable in the
relevant scientific community. Id. In contrast, under Daubert, a trial judge takes the
role of a “gatekeeper” and must consider factors such as 1) whether the expert’s
technique or theory can be tested and assessed for reliability, 2) whether the technique
or theory has been subject to peer review and publication, 3) the known or potential
rate of error of the technique or theory, 4) the existence and maintenance of standards
and controls, and 5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in
the scientific community. Anjelica Cappellino, Daubert vs. Frye: Navigating the
Standards of Admissibility for Expert Testimony, EXPERT INST. (July 24, 2020),
https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/daubert-vs-frye-navigating-thestandards-of-admissibility-for-expert-testimony/ [https://perma.cc/CNG3-SK28].
106. McCurdy, supra note 104.
107. MO. REV. STAT. § 490.065.2 (2017). The new law signed by Gov. Greitens
adopts verbatim the language of FRE 702 The new language combined with the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence dating back to Daubert will raise the standard required
for parties to introduce expert testimony. Gary Burger, New Expert Rules under HB
153 and other Expert tips (May 2017), https://burgerlaw.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/expert_presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LE9-ZX9X].
108. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
109. MO. REV. STAT. § 490.065.2.
110. State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355, 359–60 (Mo. 2020) (en banc). In his
dissenting opinion, Judge W. Brent Powell, joined by Judge Zel M. Fischer, agreed
with the majority that Lawhorn and its progeny were abrogated by § 490.065.2, but
opined that the exclusion was valid on independent grounds. Id. at 371 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Specifically, Judge Powell noted that expert testimony is admissible if it
will “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
Id. Judge Powell also noted that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by rejecting
an offer of proof if it includes admissible and inadmissible evidence. Id. Judge Powell
said that “[w]hile some of Dr. Lampinen’s testimony may have been admissible,
portions of his testimony would not have assisted the jury in understanding the
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the majority,111 then summarized Section 490.065.2 by stating that expert
testimony is admissible when it is based on sufficient facts and reliable
principles that have been reliably applied if such testimony helps the jury
understand the evidence and decide contested issues.112 Specifically, the
court clarified that, whereas in Lawhorn, expert testimony was admissible
only if the jury could not proceed in its absence, under Section 490.065.2,
the only question is whether expert testimony helps the jury.113
The majority then proceeded to apply Section 490.065.2 to the facts
of the case.114 First, the court emphasized it did not need to question, nor
did the State, whether the reliability requirements of Section
490.065.2(1)(b)-(d) were met, in light of the “unanimous” conclusion,
“near perfect scientific consensus,” and “widespread judicial recognition”
that eyewitness identification is potentially unreliable.115
Next, the court addressed whether, under Section 490.065.2, Dr.
Lampinen’s testimony would have helped the jury evaluate and
understand the eyewitness identification testimony.116 The state argued the
jury was capable of assessing the eyewitness identification without Dr.
Lampinen’s testimony because jurors are familiar with the factors
affecting eyewitness reliability.117 In response, the court acknowledged
that under the Lawhorn framework – where the court need not admit expert
testimony unless the jury could not proceed without testimony – this
argument may have worked.118 But under Section 496.065.2, the only
question is whether the expert testimony helps the jury.119 The court
emphasized that jurors rarely know that eyewitness identifications are
unreliable, and often, the science runs contrary to jurors’ commonsense
understandings.120 Thus, the majority ultimately rejected the State’s
argument and concluded that the expert testimony would help the jury.121
Second, the State argued that credibility assessments are solely
within the province of the jury.122 The court also rejected this argument,
evidence at hand.” Id. As an example, Judge Powell said Lampinen’s proffered
testimony addressed the effects of impaired eyesight on eyewitness identification,
which was not relevant to Carpenter’s case. Id. Therefore, Judge Powell concluded
that the proffered testimony was inadmissible. Id.
111. Id. at 356 (majority opinion).
112. Id. at 360.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 361.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 362.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 363.
122. Id.
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explaining that the State conflated credibility and accuracy.123 The court
explained that while it is true that it is solely within the jury’s province to
decide whether a witness is telling the truth or attempting to mislead –
credibility – eyewitness expert testimony explains the factors that cause an
eyewitness to believe he is telling the truth but be wrong – inaccuracy.124
Ultimately, the question Dr. Lampinen would have helped the jury decide
was not whether Williams was telling the truth but whether Williams’s
identification was accurate.125

V. COMMENT
This case represents a long-overdue change in how the Supreme
Court of Missouri views eyewitness expert testimony and finally brings
Missouri into alignment with the vast majority of states. This Part
discusses the positive change that State v. Carpenter represents, considers
the practical effect of this precedent for defendants, and suggests there still
is a need for further reform.

A. What Changed?
In both State v. Lawhorn and State v. Carpenter, the court held that
whether an eyewitness expert may testify is a decision left within the
discretion of a trial judge.126 So then, why is Carpenter’s holding
significant?
While it purported to give trial judges broad discretion regarding the
admissibility of eyewitness experts, Lawhorn, in effect, completely barred
expert testimony, at least as to certain subject matter.127 Specifically, in
Lawhorn, the proffered expert testimony included factors such as the
cross-race effect, the impact of the stress of an event, and the effect of the
passage of time.128 Once Lawhorn excluded this testimony, those subjects
were repeatedly held to be “within the common knowledge” of the jury,
meaning experts could not testify to them.129 But, if these factors – which
studies repeatedly show jurors do not understand – were considered to be
within the common knowledge of jurors, what kind of information would
be outside common knowledge?130

123. Id.
124. Id. at 363–64.
125. Id.
126. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 828 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); Carpenter,
605 S.W.3d at 370.
127. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 823.
128. Id.
129. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d at 360.
130. Id. at 363 n.5.
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Ultimately, the change Carpenter spurred stems from finally
acknowledging the breadth of scientific literature that has long shown the
factors Lawhorn repeatedly categorized as “within the common
experience” of jurors are in fact not understood by jurors.131 Moreover,
Carpenter admitted Lawhorn’s conflation of accuracy and reliability.132
This decision finally abandons Lawhorn’s flawed rationale, and, for
defendants with the capability of proffering expert testimony, it opens the
door for an opportunity to have such testimony admitted.133

B. Beyond Carpenter, Further Reform is Needed
There are various advantages and disadvantages to jury instructions
and expert testimony, respectively. While this Part does not argue one
safeguard is superior to the other, it focuses on two considerations: (1)
many defendants, even those erroneously accused, opt for plea deals,
which renders the availability of jury instructions or expert testimony
moot, and (2) many defendants cannot afford expert testimony.
Consequently, Missouri must implement reforms to its identification
procedures. Additionally, practically, more defendants may benefit from
the accessibility of jury instructions. Therefore, Missouri needs to revise
its existing jury instruction to better inform jurors of the way factors
impact the reliability of eyewitness identification.

1. Shortcomings of Expert Testimony and Jury Instructions
First, expert testimony and jury instructions, both potentially
effective methods for limiting the effect of erroneous eyewitness
identifications, only benefit defendants at trial.134 Yet the vast majority of
defendants never go to trial but, instead, opt for plea deals.135 Indeed, even
131. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 823; Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d at 360.
132. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d at 362.
133. Id. at 370.
134. Svein Margnussen, et. al., An Examination of the Causes and Solutions to
Eyewitness
Error,
FRONTIERS
IN
PSYCHIATRY
(Aug.
13,
2014),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4131297/ [https://perma.cc/3FA9YMYD] (discussing how jury instructions and expert testimony do not help jurors
accurately assess eyewitness identification and emphasizing the importance of a
safeguard that attacks the source of the problem rather than post misidentification).
135. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, THE NEW YORK
REVIEW (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/whyinnocent-people-plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/9ZL9-23KT] (“In 2013, while 8
percent of all federal criminal charges were dismissed (either because of a mistake in
fact or law or because the defendant had decided to cooperate), more than 97 percent
of the remainder were resolved through plea bargains, and fewer than 3 percent went
to trial. The plea bargains largely determined the sentences imposed. While
corresponding statistics for the fifty states combined are not available, it is a rare state
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falsely accused individuals plead guilty rather than risk going to trial. 136
In the plea context, jury instructions and expert testimony are irrelevant,
which emphasizes the necessity of a safeguard that prevents
misidentifications in the first place.
Second, experts are costly, not only for defendants, but for all parties
involved in the adjudication process.137 While the expense of experts
should not devalue the importance of eyewitness expert testimony,138 the
reality is that many defendants cannot afford experts.139 Additionally,
defendants typically do not have a constitutional right to expert
testimony.140 Therefore, for the indigent defendant, it is unclear whether
State v. Carpenter warrants much celebration.141

2. Identification Procedure Reform
Certainly, expert testimony and jury instructions are important
safeguards designed to mitigate the effect of misidentifications and help
the jury detect when the likelihood of misidentification is high. 142 But,

where plea bargains do not similarly account for the resolution of at least 95 percent
of the felony cases that are not dismissed . . . .”).
136. See id. (“Third, and possibly the gravest objection of all, the prosecutordictated plea bargain system, by creating such inordinate pressures to enter into plea
bargains, appears to have led a significant number of defendants to plead guilty to
crimes they never actually committed. For example, of the approximately three
hundred people that the Innocence Project and its affiliated lawyers have proven were
wrongfully convicted of crimes of rape or murder that they did not in fact commit, at
least thirty, or about 10 percent, pleaded guilty to those crimes.”).
137. Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL 40 (2014), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18891/identifying-theculprit-assessing-eyewitness-identification [https://perma.cc/5M3M-KER6] (select
“read online”).
138. Id. at 39 (“Expert testimony on eyewitness memory and identifications has
many advantages over jury instructions as a method to explain relevant scientific
framework evidence to the jury: (1) Expert witnesses can explain scientific research
in a more flexible manner, by presenting only the relevant research to the jury; (2)
Expert witnesses are familiar with the research and can describe it in detail; (3) Expert
witnesses can convey the state of the research at the time of the trial; (4) Expert
witnesses can be cross-examined by the other side; and (5) Expert witnesses can more
clearly describe the limitations of the research.”).
139. Id.
140. Id. (“In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant
has a constitutional due process right to assistance by an expert witness only if that
expert assistance is so crucial to the defense (or such a ‘significant factor’) that its
denial would deprive the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial.”).
141. See State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
142. Amy Cynkar, Order in the Court, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
(June 2007), https://www.apa.org/monitor/jun07/order [https://perma.cc/P8LPZNZF].
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identification procedures are front-end safeguards that seek to prevent
misidentification to begin with.143
In 1999, the Department of Justice published a comprehensive guide
for law enforcement, which covered procedures aimed at obtaining more
accurate eyewitness identifications.144 Since then, twenty-four states have
implemented identification procedure reform.145 In 2016, Missouri
proposed, but did not pass, Senate Bill 842, which would have required
statewide adoption of the best practices for identification procedures.146
The bill’s failure is unfortunate as “[t]he most potent means available to
the legal system to reduce eyewitness error is to conduct proper eyewitness
interviews and identification procedures.”147 Indeed, “[i]t is much easier
to prevent eyewitness errors than to detect them once they have
occurred.”148

3. Improved Jury Instruction
Jury instructions, unlike expert testimony, are readily available and
not costly.149 In fact, in State v. Henderson, the New Jersey Supreme Court
preferred jury instructions over expert testimony as a reform measure for
these very reasons.150 Regardless of whether one views expert testimony
or jury instructions as superior, when used, courts should seek to maximize
the efficacy of each.

143. Id. (“Judge and jury education, however, is only part of the solution, says
Wells. Going to the source of the problem-improving how police conduct eyewitness
interviews and identification procedures-may hold the best chances for reducing false
convictions, he says.”).
144. Report of the Special Master, supra note 2, at 52 (“In 1999, based on the work
of the Technical Working Group, the NIJ published its Guide of best practice
recommendations for law enforcement, which was followed in 2003 by the Training
Manual. Both Guide and Manual were distributed to law enforcement agencies
nationwide.”).
145. Eyewitness Identification Reform, supra note 5 (“These states are: California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia and Wisconsin.”).
146. S. 842, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016).
147. Margnussen, supra note 134.
148. Id.
149. Id.; see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 925 (N.J. 2011) (noting
enhanced jury instructions, are “focused and concise, authoritative (in that juries hear
them from the trial judge, not a witness called by one side), and cost-free”); State v.
Carpenter, 605, S.W.3d 355, 368 (Mo. 2020) (en banc) (“This Court hoped, when it
approved this instruction, that defendants could obtain the benefit of this science
without the delay and expense of having to adduce expert testimony in each case.”).
150. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 925.
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Currently, Missouri’s jury instruction apprises the jury of seventeen
factors it may consider when evaluating an eyewitness’s testimony.151
Specifically, the instruction provides:
Eyewitness identification must be evaluated with particular care. In
order to determine whether an identification made by a witness is
reliable or mistaken, you should consider all of the factors mentioned
in Instruction No. 1 concerning your assessment of the credibility of
any witness. You should also consider the following factors.
One, the witness’s eyesight;
Two, the lighting conditions at the time the witness viewed the person
in question;
Three, the visibility at the time the witness viewed the person in
question;
Four, the distance between the witness and the person in question;
Five, the angle from which the witness viewed the person in question;
Six, the weather conditions at the time the witness viewed the person
in question;
Seven, whether the witness was familiar with the person identified;
Eight, any intoxication, fatigue, illness, injury or other impairment of
the witness at the time the witness viewed the person in question;
Nine, whether the witness and the person in question are of different
races or ethnicities;
Ten, whether the witness was affected by any stress or other distraction
or event, such as the presence of a weapon, at the time the witness
viewed the person in question;
Eleven, the length of time the witness had to observe the person in
question;
Twelve, the passage of time between the witness’s exposure to the
person in question and the identification of the defendant;
Thirteen, the witness’s level of certainty of [his] [her] identification,
bearing in mind that a person may be certain but mistaken;

151. MAI-CR 310.02, supra note 83.
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Fourteen, the method by which the witness identified the defendant,
including whether it was
[i. at the scene of the offense;]
[ii. (In a live or photographic lineup.) In determining the reliability of
the identification made at the lineup, you may consider such factors as
the time elapsed between the witness’s opportunity to view the person
in question and the lineup, who was in the lineup, the instructions
given to the witness during the lineup, and any other circumstances
which may affect the reliability of the identification;]
[iii (In a live or photographic show-up.) A “show-up” is a procedure
in which law enforcement presents an eyewitness with a single suspect
for identification. In determining the reliability of the identification
made at the show-up, you may consider such factors as the time
elapsed between the witness’s opportunity to view the person in
question and the show-up, the instructions given to the witness during
the show-up, and any other circumstances which may affect the
reliability of the identification;]
Fifteen, any description provided by the witness after the event and
before identifying the defendant;
Sixteen, whether the witness’s identification of the defendant was
consistent or inconsistent with any earlier identification(s) made by the
witness; and
Seventeen, [other factors.] [any other factor which may bear on the
reliability of the witness’s identification of the defendant.]
It is not essential the witness be free from doubt as to the correctness
of the identification. However the state has the burden of proving the
accuracy of the identification of the defendant to you, the jury, beyond
a reasonable doubt before you may find [him] [her] guilty. 152

These instructions, however, fail to adequately explain how the
factors may impact the reliability of an eyewitness.153 For example, factor
152. Id. (endnotes omitted).
153. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Juries Don’t Understand Eyewitness Testimony, NEW
YORK
TIMES
(Sept.
1,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/08/31/can-we-trust-eyewitnessidentifications/juries-dont-understand-eyewitness-testimony
[https://perma.cc/BQB7-4NXX] (“Psychological scientists have long known that
many jurors hold misconceptions about the accuracy of eyewitness testimony and the
specific ways it can go awry.”); Margnussen, supra note 134 (“Lastly, jurors have
trouble integrating their knowledge of eyewitness factors into the facts of a criminal
case”).
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nine alludes to the cross-race effect by instructing the jury to consider the
respective race of the defendant and the eyewitness.154 But, how does a
juror know which way this factor cuts? If the perpetrator and the
eyewitness are of the same race, does this indicate that identification is
more likely to be accurate or inaccurate? And, studies repeatedly show
that jurors do not understand how race affects the accuracy of
identifications.155 Additionally, factor ten advises of “stress” and that the
jury ought to consider the “presence of a weapon.”156 Yet, again, this does
not tell the jury whether this factor tends to make an eyewitness
identification more or less accurate. Indeed, Carpenter recognized
“[n]othing in MAI-CR 310.02 tells the jury whether the presence of a
particular factor increases or decreases reliability, and nothing in that
instruction explains to the jury why these factors have the effect they do
or how they can interact.”157
The use of jury instructions and expert testimony is premised on the
idea that jurors do not understand how or the degree to which various
factors affect eyewitness testimony.158 And, importantly, many factors are
actually counterintuitive.159 For example, one may think that if an event
is highly stressful, one is more likely to remember it accurately.160 Thus,
while factor ten tells the juror to consider stress, an uninformed juror might
believe that, when a weapon is present, an eyewitness is likely to have
better remembered a perpetrator due to extreme stress – a conclusion
contrary to scientific consensus.161 Missouri’s eyewitness instruction may
alert the jury to a checklist, but does not indicate whether checking off
certain factors indicates the juror should be more suspicious of the
identification or believe that it is likely to be more accurate.
The scientific community has relentlessly sought to help the criminal
justice system understand that jurors, attorneys, and even judges, do not
know why eyewitness testimony is more likely to be inaccurate in a

154. MAI-CR 310.02, supra note 83.
155. Loftus, supra note 153 (“For example, many respondents believed that a
cross-racial identification (identifying a stranger of a different race) would be just as
reliable as or even more reliable than a same-race identification.”).
156. MAI-CR 310.02, supra note 83.
157. State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355, 368 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
158. See State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 731 n.32 (Conn. 2012).
159. Benton, supra note 57.
160. State v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 724 (Conn. 2012) (“Similarly, the average
person is likely to believe that eyewitnesses held at gunpoint or otherwise placed in
fear are likely to have been acutely observant and therefore more accurate in their
identifications.”).
161. Id. at 732 (recognizing “high stress at the time of observation may render a
witness less able to retain an accurate perception and memory of the observed
events”).
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particular case.162 Unfortunately, the factors listed in MAI-CR 310.02,
without giving the juror an indication of how to consider each factor, are
not sufficiently informative.163
Considered solely for its improvement to the admissibility standard
for eyewitness expert testimony, State v. Carpenter certainly moved
Missouri law in the right direction.164 But when taking a broader view and
considering the entirety of Missouri’s jurisprudence and general criminal
justice schema for combatting the leading cause of wrongful convictions
– erroneous eyewitness testimony – State v. Carpenter is but a step.

VI. CONCLUSION
State v. Carpenter represents a massive change in attitude toward
eyewitness expert testimony and exposes the weaknesses in Missouri’s
general schema for combatting erroneous eyewitness identification.
Despite the positive step Carpenter takes, expert eyewitness testimony
alone is insufficient to protect against the fallibility of eyewitness
identification. Missouri must not let another thirty years pass before
addressing other safeguards designed to protect defendants from
misidentification. Instead, Missouri should proactively implement
identification procedure reform and improve its existing jury instruction.

162. See Kate A. Houston, et. al., Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Evidence: In
Search
of
Common
Sense,
BEHAV.
SCI.
LAW
(2013),
http://www.pc.rhul.ac.uk/sites/rheg/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Houston-HopeMemon-and-Read-20132.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG5A-VCGK].
163. MAI-CR 310.02, supra note 83.
164. State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d 355 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
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